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TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES:
BILATERAL GRAIN TRADE DISPUTES WITH CANADA
WON W. Koo & IHN H. UHM*
ABSTRACT
Agricultural trade between the United States and Canada has been
contentious since the inception of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUSTA) in 1989, mainly because Canadian exports
of wheat and barley to the United States increased significantly,
while U.S. exports remain unchanged. Research conducted by
many leading agricultural economists indicates that the asym-
metric trade flows of wheat and barley between the two countries,
caused by differences in trade policies, farm subsidies, and
marketing institutions have resulted in several trade disputes be-
tween the two countries under the U.S. trade remedy laws.
Wheat producers in the United States are increasingly relying on the
U.S. trade remedy laws, such as anti-dumping and countervailing duty,
which requires injury test prior to an imposition of counter measures to
correct a surge in wheat imports from Canada. Although some agricultural
economists in the two countries call for a gradual harmonization of trade
policies, farm subsidies, and marketing institutions for agricultural products
in a globalized world to reduce trade disputes between the two countries,
the current trend for seeking relief by trade remedy laws would continue as
long as the surge in Canadian wheat exports remain unabated.
The United States and Canada are two of the world's largest exporters
of grains, wheat and barley in particular, and compete with each other in
major foreign markets.' They share a common interest in reducing govern-
ment interference in world agricultural markets and encouraging free world
* Won W. Koo is Director of the Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies and a Chamber
of Commerce Distinguished Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at North
Dakota State University. Ihn H. Uhm is a Senior Economist at the Canadian International Trade
Tribunal in Ottawa, Ontario. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not represent the opinions of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal. Any
errors or omissions are the authors.
1. See generally International Grains Council, International Grain Statistics, available at
http://www.imf.org (last viewed Jan. 9, 2003) (providing exporter statistics).
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trade. This does not preclude them from disagreements over agricultural
trade that arises from the differences in agricultural policies and marketing
systems between the two countries.
The Canada and U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA)2 and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)3, which includes Mexico, be-
came effective in 1989 and 1994, respectively. The CUSTA has been fully
implemented for bilateral trade between the United States and Canada.
NAFTA will create the largest single market in the world, a market of about
420 million consumers and trade valued at over $25 billion annually, when
the agreement is fully implemented.
The CUSTA has resulted in an increase in trade volume between the
United States and Canada. For agricultural commodities and products, the
increase has been greater for Canadian exports to the United States than for
U.S. exports to Canada.4 Average volumes of Canadian exports of wheat
and barley to the United States were greater than average U.S. exports to
Canada for the 1990-2002 period. 5 In addition, Canadian exports to the U.S
have increased faster than U.S. exports to Canada.6 U.S. imports of Cana-
dian western red spring wheat (CWRS), for example, increased from 13.2
million bushels in 1990 to over 77.5 million bushels in 1994 and then
decreased to 44.1 million bushels in 2002.7 However, U.S. exports of hard
red spring wheat (HRS) to Canada averaged only about 0.9 million bushels
per year during the 1990-2002 period. 8 Trade in durum wheat between the
2. Can.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter
CUSTA]. The CUSTA created a free trade area comprised of Canada and the United States. Id.
at 281. Objectives of the Agreement are the following:
[E]liminate barriers to trade in goods and services between [the two countries];
facilitate conditions of fair competition within the free-trade area; liberalize
significantly conditions for investment within the free-trade area; establish effective
procedures for the joint administration of this Agreement and the resolution of
disputes; and lay the foundation for further bilateral and multilateral cooperation to
expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
Id. at 293. The CUSTA established rules of origin for determining whether goods were
"originating" and entitled to CUSTA benefits. Id. at 295. Tariffs were to have been eliminated on
all goods by January 1, 1998. Id.
3. See NAFTA: What's It All About?, External Affairs and International Trade, 1993; R.G.
LIPSEY ET AL., THE NAFTA: WHAT'S IN, WHAT'S OUT, WHAT'S NEXT, POLICY STUDY 21,
Toronto, Ontario: C.D. Howe Institute, xii (1994). NAFTA creates a free trade area that
encompasses Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. Id. The basic format of NAFTA closely follows that
of the CUSTA, and a number of provisions of NAFTA have been designed to rectify difficulties
experienced under CUSTA. Id.







two countries was similar to that for HRS wheat.9 The import surge in the
early 1990s led to the negotiation of a temporary agreement to limit
Canadian wheat exports to the United States. 10
U.S. barley imports from Canada also grew rapidly, from 9.9 million
bushels in 1990 to nearly 89.7 million bushels in 1994, and then decreased
to 22 million bushels in 2002.11 The imports accounted for over 10 percent
of U.S. domestic consumption for the 1990-2001 period. 12 During the same
period, U.S. barley exports to Canada averaged 1.4 million bushels per
year.13
Because of rapid increases in Canadian export supply of grains into the
United States in the post-CUSTA era, grain producers in Minnesota,
Montana, and North Dakota have sought protection not only by means of
the U.S. trade remedy laws, but also at times by means of border blockades
of Canadian grain and livestock shipments to the United States. For ex-
ample, South Dakota Governor Bill Janklow announced new inspection
requirements for all trucks carrying Canadian grain and livestock beginning
September 16, 1998.14 Governors of North Dakota, Montana, and Idaho
followed the South Dakota measures and announced a stepped-up effort to
inspect Canadian trucks as they cross the border into these states. 15 On
December 2, 1998, in the aftermath of a series of trade disputes, the United
9. Id.
10. See U.S. Trade Representative Release 94-43, US Statement Regarding Trade Between
the United States and Canada on Wheat, available at http://www.ustr.gov. The agreement was
effective for only one year from September 12, 1994 to September 11, 1995. Id.
11. See infra Table 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of South Dakota (September 15, 1998) (on
file with author). Trucks carrying Canadian grain must supply proof that the grain is free from
Karnal Bunt and wild oats. Id. In addition, the grain should be free of the following six
chemicals: dimetridazole, ipronidazol, nitroimidazoles, fluoroquinolones, glycopeptides, and
sulfamethazine. Id.
15. Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of North Dakota (September 15, 1998) (on
file with author); Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Montana (September 15, 1998)
(on file with author); Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Idaho (September 15, 1998)
(on file with author). In addition, North Dakota proposed a law that would restrict the entry of
Canadian products under the guise of technical requirements. See Press Release, Office of the
Governor, State of North Dakota (September 15, 1998) (on file with author). The proposed new
law would prohibit a wide range of Canadian agricultural products from entering North Dakota
without the necessary scientific justification required by NAFTA and by domestic U.S.
regulations. Id. The Canadian government vigorously protested to defend the rights of Canadian
exporters of agricultural goods. News Release, Foreign Affairs and International Trade No. 72
(April 1, 1999) (on file with author). In this regard, Canada requested NAFTA consultations on
the North Dakota trade barrier. See id.
2003]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
States and Canada announced the Record of Understanding in agricultural
trade to ease tension between the two countries. 16
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the nature, causes, and
future perspectives of the bilateral grain trade disputes in the post-CUSTA
era. First, this paper examines the market conditions conducive to trade
flows between the United States and Canada to provide a better under-
standing of trade disputes on grain between the two countries. Second, this
paper briefly reviews legal aspects of the current U.S. trade remedy laws
applicable to grain trade. Afterward, this paper reviews the nature of bi-
lateral grain trade disputes and the extent to which various U.S. trade
remedy laws have been applied against grain imports from Canada in the
post-CUSTA era. As Canadian durum and hard red spring wheat is under
anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigation by the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission (USITC), this paper also examines the statutory
requirements of the injury determination process by the USITC.
I. MAIN REASONS FOR ASYMMETRIC BILATERAL TRADE
FLOWS FOR WHEAT AND BARLEY
Bilateral trade flows of wheat and barley between the United States
and Canada under CUSTA are influenced by differences in resource en-
dowments, marketing systems, availability of marketable surpluses,
differences in crop quality, and farm policies between the two countries.
Economic analyses conducted by numerous economists over many years
indicate that these differences have contributed to prolonged asymmetric
bilateral trade flows between the two countries, which in turn, have resulted
in several trade disputes during the last fifteen years.
The sizes of the domestic markets for hard red spring (HRS) wheat,
durum wheat, and barley in Canada are much smaller than those in the
United States. 17 However, the quantities of wheat and barley produced in
Canada are larger than those produced in the United States. 18 As a result,
Canada has substantial marketable surpluses of grain and, therefore, is more
dependent upon export markets than the United States. On average, Canada
exports about seventy-five percent of its wheat and fifteen percent of its
16. Record of Understanding between the Governments of Canada and the United States of
America Regarding Areas of Agricultural Trade, available at
http://www.agr.ca/cb/trade/canus/html/record-e.phtml (last modified June 24, 2003).
17. International Grains Council, World Grain Statistics, 1999-2001, available at




barley.' 9 Under CUSTA, the U.S. market became attractive to Canadian
producers mainly because it is the closest and largest market.
In Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) markets wheat and
barley for exports. The CWB pays producers an initial price when the grain
is delivered and returns any revenue surplus to producers as final pay-
ments. 20 In the United States, grain is marketed by individual grain trading
firms. U.S. wheat and barley in the world market often compete with CWB
grain. The CWB controls grain exports to both offshore and U.S. markets
through export licenses. Some Canadian producers of wheat and barley are
in proximity to the U.S. view, therefore the lack of direct access to the U.S.
market arising from the actions of the CWB works to their detriment.
Nevertheless, it is perceived in the United States that the CWB may distort
trade flows.21 The argument is that the CWB has monopsony power in
purchasing agricultural commodities from producers and at the same time,
is a single desk sales agency that has the exclusive right to make marketing
decisions regarding prices and quantities. 22 Thus, it is argued that the CWB
is able to exercise price discrimination to maximize profits in world
markets and has an unfair advantage over private firms in the United
States. 23 However, the World Trade Organization (WTO), under Article
XVII: 1, allows a state trading enterprise to charge different prices between
markets, provided it is done for commercial reasons based on market
conditions in export markets.24 It is also argued that the CWB does not
provide sufficient information regarding its general operation. This is
especially true regarding purchase and sales price information for
agricultural commodities. 25 Schmitz and Koo argue that these practices by
the CWB represent an unfair advantage over their U.S. competitors. 26
19. International Grains Council, World Grain Statistics, available at
http://www.igc.org.uk/brochure/brochuree.htm.
20. David J. Simonot, The Economics of State Trading in Wheat (1997) (unpublished M.S.
thesis, University of Saskatchewan) (on file with author).
21. Merlinda Ingco & Francis Ng, Distortionary Effects of State Trading in Agriculture:
Issues for the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation (1988), available at
http://www.econ.worldbank.org/docs/758.pdf.
22. Id. The CWB is a trading agency that is the sole legal exporter for wheat and barley
grown in Western Canada. Id. The Canadians argue the CWB is a "cooperative;" others argue
that it is a state agency. Id. Its obligatory relationship with wheat grain farmers sets it apart from
the usual conception of a cooperative. Id. The CWB operates both as a monopoly and as a
monopsony within the boundaries of Canada. Id. Internationally, the CWB and the large U.S.
grain-marketing firms may be considered as oligopolies within the North American wheat market.
Id.
23. Id.
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2905 (1994).
25. See Troy C. Schmitz & Won W. Koo, An Economic Analysis of International Feed and
Malting Barley Markets: An Econometric Spatial Oligopolistic Approach, Agricultural
Economics Report No. 357, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State
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The Canadian rail subsidy was an indirect subsidy provided by the
Canadian government under the Western Grain Transportation Act
(WGTA) to farmers for shipments of the designated grains from producing
regions to export ports.27 U.S. grain producers argued that, under the
WGTA, Canadian grains were more competitive in offshore markets.
Canada, however, eliminated the controversial rail subsidy under the
WGTA in 1995. Contrary to the expectations of U.S. grain producers, the
elimination of the rail subsidy induced larger inflows of grains into the
United States. The elimination of the WGTA has ultimately made the U.S.
market more attractive for Canadian producers because transportation costs
from the Canadian prairies to the United States are lower than those from
the Canadian prairies to most offshore markets. 28
The exchange rate between the two currencies also plays an important
role in bilateral trade of agricultural commodities and products. Since the
U.S. economy has been stronger than the Canadian economy since 1985,
the U.S. dollar has appreciated against the Canadian dollar. The U.S. dollar
appreciation makes U.S. agricultural commodities more expensive in the
Canadian market and conversely makes Canadian agricultural commodities
less expensive in the U.S. market.29 A study by Kim et al. found that the
University, Fargo (1996). Agricultural economists in Canada argue that American grain exporting
finns (e.g., Cargill) do not reveal export prices either. Id. Therefore, it is not transparent the
extent to which these firms engage in price discrimination. Id. Economists further argue that
whether or not Canadian producers have benefited from price discrimination by the CWB is a
moot point. Id.
26. Id.
27. Western Grain Transportation Act, I.E.L. V-B-2, January 2, 1988. The WGTA was
enacted in 1983 in an attempt to modernize the century-old statutory rail freight, which is known
as the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement or the Crow Rate. Id. Under the WGTA, the Canadian
government provided rail companies with annual payments of up to C$658 million with an
adjustment for inflation to cover the transportation costs of eligible grain shipments to selected
shipping terminals at western and eastern ports. Id. Under this Act, shipping costs from Canadian
prairies to offshore markets were lower than the shipping costs from U.S. producing regions to the
same offshore markets. Id. It is argued by U.S. grain producers that Canada enjoyed a
competitive advantage over the Unite States in shipping grains to these markets. Id. Under the
CUSTA, however, Canada's WGTA is eliminated for grain shipped through West Coast ports for
U.S. consumption. Id. See Won. W. Koo & Ihn H. Uhm, United States and Canadian Rail
Freight-Rate Structures: A Comparative Analysis, 32 CANADIAN J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 301-26
(1984) (comparing rail freight structures between the United States and Canada prior to the
enactment of the WGTA).
28. JD. Johnson & William Wilson, Canadian Rail Subsidies and Continental Barley Flows:
A Spatial Analysis, 31 LOGISTIC AND TRANSP. REV. 31-46; Mao, Weining, Won W. Koo & Mark
Krause, World Feed Barley Trade Under Alternative Trade Policy Scenarios, Agricultural
Economics Report NO. 350, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State
University, Fargo.
29. For example, assume that Canadian wheat priced at C$5.00/bushel is sold at $3.75/bushel
in the U.S. market at an exchange rate of C$1.40/$1.00. If the U.S. dollar appreciates from
C$1.40 to C$1.50, the price of Canadian wheat decreases from $3.57 to $3.33 in the U.S. market.
On the other hand, U.S. wheat priced at $3.57 will be C$4.90 in Canada at an exchange rate of
[VOL. 79:921
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exchange rate has significant short- and long-run influence on bilateral
trade between the two countries and also affects U.S. agricultural income.30
Another important contributing factor affecting trade flows of grain
between the two countries is differences in the quality of grain delivered to
downstream industries such as millers and pasta manufacturers. 31 This is
especially true for HRS, durum wheat, and barley trade between the two
countries. U.S. millers demand high quality durum wheat. Whenever the
United States cannot produce enough high quality durum wheat to meet
domestic demand-due to weather conditions and diseases during the
growing season-U.S. millers have imported high quality durum wheat
from Canada. Similarly, Canadian malting barley is desired by U.S.
maltsters because of its attributes. Canadian feed barley, on the other hand,
competes with other carbohydrate materials such as corn and sorghum as a
livestock feed.
II. DIFFERENCES IN TRADE BARRIERS OF WHEAT AND
BARLEY: PRE- AND POST-CUSTA ERA
Did differences in the level of traditional trade barriers (e.g., tariffs,
quotas, etc.) between the two countries contribute to the asymmetric
bilateral trade flows? Tariffs imposed (e.g., tariffs and non-tariff barriers)
by the United States prior to 1989 were $7.70/ton for wheat, $2.30/ton for
malting barley, and $3.40/ton for other barley; those imposed by Canada
C$1.40/$1.00 and will be C$5.25 at an exchange rate of C$1.50/$1.00. Since most transactions
occur in terms of U.S. dollars in the world market, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar against
Canadian dollar does make grains worth more at the Canadian farm gate and encourages exports.
See JR. Coleman & Karl D. Meilke, The Influence of Exchange Rates on Red Meat Trade
Between Canada and the United States, 36 CANADIAN J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 401-24 (1988)
(indicating that numerous empirical studies have confirmed this hypothesis).
30. Mina Kim et al., Does Exchange Rate Matter to Agricultural Bilateral Trade Between
the United States and Canada?, Agribusiness and Applied Economics Report No. 466, Center for
Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies, Dept. of Agribusiness and Applied Economics, North
Dakota State University, Fargo (2002).
31. See United States International Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.), Durum Wheat:
Conditions of Competition Between the U.S. and Canadian Industries, Report on Investigation
No. 332-285 under Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, USITC Pub. 2274, 3-1 to
3-5 (1990). The quality variables of concern to the millers in the United States have grown from
basic visual grade specifications to include the following: vitreousness and protein (the quality of
gluten); crop years used in blending moisture content; mold and mildew; dockage/cleanliness;
falling number, which is a measure of sprouting damage; sedimentation; mixograph tests; and
color. Id. It should be noted that while the color of bread wheat does not carry to the end product,
the color of a durum wheat does, thereby determining the color of the pasta end product. Id.
According to U.S. milling industry sources, mills are not willing to purchase on the basis of U.S.
grade alone. Id. The U.S. system of post harvest handling and distribution permits blending
between different grades; the Canadian one does not. Id. Millers purchasing grain from Canada
will receive the average of a grade, with cleanliness and uniformity assures. Id. The difference
between the two sources has led to a perception that U.S. grain is of lower quality than Canadian
grain when comparing similar grades. Id.
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were C$4.40/ton for wheat and C$2.30/ton for all barley. 32 Under the
CUSTA, tariffs on wheat and barley were placed on a schedule of elim-
ination in ten equal segments and, therefore, were eliminated completely by
January 1, 1998.33
In Canada, imports of wheat from the United States had been subject to
import licenses, administered by the Canadian Wheat Board, but these were
removed immediately after the implementation of CUSTA.34 In 1991,
however, Canada instituted a legal regime that an end-use certificate
(EUC), permitted under CUSTA Article 705(1), must accompany American
wheat destined for processing in Canada. 35 Canadian processors importing
U.S. wheat must request the EUC from the Canadian Grain Commission.36
Subsequently, the United States government also instituted an end-use cer-
tificate (EUC) requirement for all Canadian wheat entering the United
States, effective February 27, 1995.37
In the post CUSTA/NAFTA and post-Uruguay Round era, however,
the traditional trade policy instruments such as tariffs and quotas are all ef-
fectively removed from policy makers' toolbox. 38 The remaining effective
instruments to deal with unfair import competition and/or massive imports
that are fairly traded but market disrupting are trade remedy laws (e.g., anti-
dumping and, to a lesser extent, countervailing duty laws and safeguard
measures), which require an "injury test" prior to the imposition of any
remedial measures. 39 The WTO signatories are prohibited from imposing
remedial measures in the absence of the "injury determination" that is a
crucial element of international trade administrative law.40
32. Karl M. Rich et al., The Dynamics in the Wheat and Wheat Products Sector: U.S.-
Canada Comparison, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE UNDER CUSTA, 95 (Koo & Wilson eds., 2002).
33. CUSTA, supra note 2, at Art. 705.
34. This requirement allowed the CWB to operate the two-price wheat policy. The CWB has
an explicit policy to sell to domestic millers at a price equal to or less than the landed price of
equivalent U.S. grain. Interest groups in the U.S. argue that as a result of CWB policy on wheat,
imports into Canada from the U.S. have been limited to very small volumes and restricted at times
when there is a shortage of specific qualities of Canadian wheat. Jeremy Mattson & Won W.
Koo, Canadian Exports of Wheat and Barley to the United States and Impacts on U.S. Domestic
Prices, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE UNDER CUSTA, supra note 32, at 73-92.
35. Canadian Grain Act as Form I of Schedule XV, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en-
G-10/index.html (last updated April 30, 2003).
36. D.E. Buckingham & R. Gray, North American Wheat Wars and the End-Use Certificate,
Compromising Free Trade? 30 J. OF WORLD TRADE, 196 (June 1996).
37. The use of EUCs on commodities applies only when Canada applies them to American
products under Section 321 (f) of the NAFTA Implementation Act. Id. at 198.
38. The existing Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rates are bound by the WTO in most
cases. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, 29-30.




III. U.S. TRADE REMEDY LAWS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO
WHEAT/BARLEY TRADE
As shown in Table 2, there are six statutes that constitute the domain of
the U.S. trade remedy laws applicable to protect domestic producers of
agricultural products from fairly or unfairly trading foreign competitors.
They are an anti-dumping law (Subtitle B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended), a countervailing duty law (Subtitle A of Title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended), the Agricultural Adjustment Act (Section
22), Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Conditions of Competition),
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Enforcement Action), and safeguards
under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (escape action or import
relief).41 Out of six statutes, the following three statutes require a legally
binding "injury test" prior to an imposition of the counter measures: (i) anti-
dumping law, (ii) countervailing duty law, and (iii) safeguards action under
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.42 The anti-dumping (AD) and coun-
tervailing duty (CVD) are the two most frequently used trade remedy laws
to protect domestic producers from unfair trading practices by foreign
exporters. The U.S. Congress delegated the administration of the AD and
CVD to two agencies: the International Trade Administration (ITA), which
is part of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), and the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission (USITC).43 Although these two laws are aimed
at various forms of unfair trade, they have many procedural and substantive
similarities. Dumping generally refers to a form of international price dis-
crimination; goods are sold in one export market at prices lower than the
prices at which comparable goods are sold in the home market of the
exporter or in its other export markets. Section 251 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act provides that a subsidy exists if there is a financial con-
tribution by a government or a public body or any form of income or price
support that confers a benefit.44
The current U.S. anti-dumping law is Subtitle B of Title VII (§§ 731-
739) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which provides that anti-
dumping duty shall be imposed, in addition to any other duty, if two
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG.,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 59-60, 67 (COMM. PRINT 1997)
[hereinafter COMMrilrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS].
44. Id. "Examples of financial contribution include a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants,
loans, equity infusions), a potential direct transfer (e.g., loan guarantees), the foregoing of revenue
otherwise due (e.g., tax credits), the provision of goods or services, other than general
infrastructure, or the purchase of goods." Id. at 62.
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conditions are met.45 The two conditions include: (i) the U.S. Department
of Commerce must determine that "a class or kind of foreign merchandise"
is being or is likely to be sold in the U.S. at "less than its fair value," and
(ii) the U.S. International Trade Commission must determine that "an
industry in the U.S. is materially injured or is threatened with material in-
jury, or the establishment of an industry in the U.S. is materially retarded by
reason of imports of that merchandise." 46
On the other hand, the purpose of the CVD is to offset any unfair
competitive advantage that foreign countervailable subsidies. The CVD
law under Subtitle A of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, provides that a countervailing
duty shall be imposed, in addition to any other duty, equal to the amount of
net countervailable subsidy if two conditions are met.47 First, the DOC
must determine that a countervailable subsidy is being provided, directly or
indirectly, "with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class
or kind of merchandise imported, or sold into the U.S." and must determine
the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.48 Second, the USITC must
determine that "an industry in the United States is materially injured,4 9 or is
threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the
United States is materially retarded by reason of imports of that mer-
chandise or by reason of sales of that merchandise for importation." 50
45. 19U.S.C. § 1673 (1999).
46. Id.
47. 19 U.S.C. Ch. 4; 19 U.S.C. Ch. 13; U.S.: Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, May 1985, 24
I.L.M. 823 (1985); U.S.: Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, August 23, 1988, 28
I.L.M. (1989); 19 U.S.C. Ch. 22 (1994).
48. COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 43, at 59.
49. It should be noted that nothing in the WTO Agreements specifies the degree of harm that
domestic investigative agencies are required to find for injury to be "material." Therefore,
economists on this subject argue that the concept of material injury is more a matter of subjective
judgment in the eye of the beholder.
50. 19 U.S.C. Ch. 4; 19 U.S.C. Ch. 13; U.S.: Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, May 1985, 24
I.L.M. 823 (1985); U.S.: Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, August 23, 1988, 28
I.L.M. (1989); 19 U.S.C. Ch. 22 (1994). The 1979 GATT Codes and the WTO Agreements
require proof of a linkage between the dumping (or subsidization) on the one hand and the
material injury on the other. This relationship is best described as the "causal link." 19 U.S.C. §
2501. This is the sine qua non for the application of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. Both
Agreements require the investigative agencies and the complainants to demonstrate that the
subject imports, through the "effects" of the dumping or subsidization, are causing material injury
and to not attribute injury caused by other factors to the imports under examination. The causality
provisions of the 1979 Code are repeated in Article 3 of the 1994 anti-dumping agreement with
some important additions. The additions represent a modest tightening up of the requirements for
causality and an attempt by the UR negotiators to ensure that all extraneous factors affecting the
domestic industry are excluded from the assessment of the evidence.
[VOL. 79:921
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If an interested party is dissatisfied with a final AD or CVD
determination or review, they may file an action in the United States Court
of International Trade.5l Decisions of the United States Court of Inter-
national Trade are subject to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.52 In addition, as a result of provisions in the
CUSTA/NAFTA and its implementing legislation, final determinations in
AD or CVD proceedings involving products of Canada and Mexico are
reviewed by a NAFTA panel instead of by the United States Court of Inter-
national Trade if the United States, Canadian, or Mexican government so
requests.53 In the event of a dispute with the United States, Canada and
Mexico would have recourse through either the NAFTA or WTO forum,
depending on the nature of the dispute; disputes involving NAFTA ob-
ligations would be resolved under NAFTA, and disputes involving WTO
rules would seek resolution under the WTO.54
In addition to the AD and CBD laws, import relief (safeguards) under
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by Section 1401 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and Sections 301-304 of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act set forth the authority and procedures
for the President to take action, to facilitate efforts by a domestic industry
which has been seriously injured by imports to make a positive adjustment
to imports competition.55 If serious injury results from increased com-
petition by import that are not necessarily traded unfairly, then domestic
industries should be provided a period of relief to allow them to adjust to
new conditions of trade. This mechanism, while amended over the years,
has provided authority for the President to withdraw or modify concessions
and impose duties or other restrictions -quotas, tariff rate quotas, negotiate
orderly marketing arrangements, surtaxes, etc.-for a limited period of time
on imports of any article that causes or threatens serious injury to the
domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive article, following
an investigation and determination by the USITC.56
51. COMMITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 43, at 79-80.
52. Id. at 62.
53. See CUSTA, supra note 2, at ch. 19, art. 1901 (1989) (describing that Canada and the
United States have agreed to create a bi-national dispute settlement mechanism, whereby, in case
of dispute, the application of AD and CVD laws by national trade agencies may be reviewed by a
specially created system of ad hoc panels instead of by the courts); 19 U.S.C. § 1902 (1999)
(stating that the NAFTA panel will apply U.S. law and U.S. standards of judicial review to decide
whether U.S. law was applied correctly by the DOC and the USITC).
54. WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 1, available at
http://www.org/English/tratop-e/dsue.htm.
55. U.S.: Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, August 23, 1988, 28 I.L.M.
(1989); 19 U.S.C. Ch. 22 (1994).
56. COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 43, at 98-99.
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Safeguards have their origin in Article XIX of GATT of 1947 (often
referred to as an "escape clause").57 Its primary objective was to give
GATT signatories the possibility of assisting domestic producers that could
not compete with increased imports as a result of trade liberalizing mea-
sures. The 1994 UR Agreements made substantive changes to Article XIX.
The WTO Safeguards Agreement contains new sunset provisions as op-
posed to the old GATT Article XIX rule that allows safeguards to stay in
place "to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or
remedy the injury."58 New safeguard measures are, as a general rule, to last
no longer than four years. 59 Compensation was no longer required for mea-
sures applied on a Most Favored Nation (MFN) basis for up to three
years.60
There is a fundamental difference between safeguard measures and AD
and CVD measures. AD/CVD remedies have no international prior noti-
fication and consultation requirements as do safeguard import measures.
The need for safeguard measures presupposes that, because of their lack of
competitiveness, producers cannot adjust quickly enough to major upward
swings in import penetration. The need for AD/CVD measures
presupposes that by removing injurious dumping or subsidizing, domestic
producers can compete with fairly traded imports.
Safeguards cannot be used where imports have caused injury only
through price suppression or erosion.61 In addition, a key difference is that
the finding in a safeguard inquiry considers the effects of imports from all
sources rather than the effects of imports from a country or certain countries
found to be dumped or subsidized. In safeguard inquiries, it is clear from
the Agreement that an actual increase in imports, either in absolute or
relative terms, is required for a finding of serious injury.62 In AD/CVD
cases, there can be a finding of injury in the absence of an increase in
57. GATT art. XIX (1947).
58. Id.
59. Uruguay Round, Agreement on Safeguards, reprinted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW HANDBOOK, 524 (2001). However, the text allows considerable room for departure
from this rule, giving the contracting party concerned the right to extend the measures for another
four years, but only if it has determined by a proper hearing and consideration of all evidence that:
(a) continuation of the measures is necessary to prevent a recurrence of serious injury and (b) the
domestic industry is adjusting. Id.
60. Id. at 525. In other words, import restrictions cannot be directed to a particular country
or group of countries but must be applied to all imports across-the-board. Non-MFN measures
were permitted in certain limited circumstances (e.g., safeguard provisions under China's WTO
accession protocol). Id.
61. The material injury test required in the AD/CVD context has a relatively lower threshold
than that of the serious injury test required in the safeguards investigation.
62. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2571-3572 (West 1999); Uruguay Round, Agreement on Safeguards, at
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imports providing that it can be demonstrated that injury was incurred in
some other way, especially price erosion or suppression. 63 However, many
similarities exist between safeguards and AD/CVD injury inquiries. Both
deal with injury and must be based on "positive evidence" or "objective
evidence." 64
Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended,
authorizes the President to impose fees or quotas on imported products that
undermine any United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) domestic
commodity program.65 This authority is designed to prevent imports from
interfering with the USDA efforts to stabilize domestic agricultural com-
modity prices. Under Section 22, the Secretary of Agriculture advises the
President when the Secretary has reason to believe that (i) imports of an ar-
ticle are rendering or tending to render, ineffective, or materially interfering
with, any domestic, agricultural-commodity price-support program, or other
agricultural program; or (ii) imports of an article are reducing substantially
the amount of any product processed in the United States from any
agricultural commodity or product covered by such programs. 66 If the
President agrees that there is reason for the Secretary's belief, the President
must order an USITC investigation and report. 67 On the basis of this report,
the President must determine whether the statutory conditions warranting
imposition of a Section 22 quota or fee exist.68
If the President makes an affirmative determination, he is required to
impose, by proclamation, either import fees (which may not exceed fifty
percent ad valorem) or import quotas (which may not exceed fifty percent
of the quantity imported during a representative period) sufficient to
prevent imports of the product concerned from harming or interfering with
the relevant agricultural program.69 In the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture, however, the United States agreed to convert all quotas and
fees on imports from any country to which the United States applies the
WTO Agreement to tariff rate quotas.7 0 The Uruguay Round Agreement on
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 7 U.S.C. § 624(a) (1933).
66. Id. Unlike AD, CVD, and safeguards investigations, Section 22 requires a relatively
modest legally binding test, which is known as the material interference test. Id. The material
interference test only asks do imports "materially interfere with a farm commodity program... in
the United States?" Id. § 624(a). This test is less stringent with a lower threshold than that of the
material injury test. CoMMrrrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 43, at 124.
67. 7 U.S.C. § 624(a).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 624(b).
70. Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, reprinted in BHALA, supra note 59, at 308-
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Agriculture, Section 22 authority is applicable only to imports from
countries to which the United States does not apply the WTO Agreement. 71
Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, also provides that
the USITC investigates and reports to the President and Congress on the
administrative, fiscal, and industrial effects of the United States customs
laws; the relations between the duty rates on raw materials and finished or
partly finished products; the effects of ad valorem and specific duties and of
compound specific and ad valorem duties to investigate the operation of
customs laws, including their relationship to the Federal revenues; their
effect upon the industries and labor of the country; and to submit reports of
its investigations as hereafter provided.72 The Commission has the power
to investigate the tariff relations between the United States and foreign
countries; commercial treaties; preferential provisions; economic alliances;
the effect of export bounties and preferential transportation rates; the
volume of imports compared with domestic production and consumption;
and conditions, causes, and effects relating to competition of foreign
industries with those of the United States, including dumping and the cost
of production. 73  Investigation under Section 332 often provides
information for the President and Congress suggesting relief measures
provided under another statute. 74
Finally, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, provides
the authority and procedures to enforce U.S. rights under international trade
agreements and to respond to certain unfair foreign practices. 75 If the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) determines that a foreign act, policy, or
practice violates or is inconsistent with a trade agreement or is unjustifiable
and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, then action by the USTR to
enforce the trade agreement's rights or to obtain the elimination of the act,
policy, or practice is mandatory, subject to the specific direction, if any, of
the President.76
The USTR has discretionary authority to take all appropriate and
feasible action, subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President, to
obtain the elimination of the act, policy, or practice. 77 With respect to the
form of action, the USTR is authorized to (i) suspend, withdraw, or prevent
the application of benefits of trade agreement concession to carry out a
71. COMMIT-EE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 43, at 123.
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
73. Id. § 1332(b).
74. Id. § 2112.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000).
76. Id. § 2411(a).
77. Id. § 2411(b).
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trade agreement with the foreign country involved; (ii) impose duties or
other import restrictions on the goods of and, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, fees, or restrictions on the services of, the foreign country
for such time as the USTR deems appropriate; (iii) withdraw or suspend
preferential duty treatment (e.g., under the Generalized System of
Preferences, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, etc.); or (iv) enter into binding
agreements that commit the foreign country to (a) eliminate or phase out
the act, policy, or practice, (b) eliminate any burden or restriction on U.S.
commerce resulting from the act, policy, or practice, or (c) provide the
United States with compensatory trade benefits that are satisfactory to the
USTR.78
IV. HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS OF BILATERAL
WHEAT/BARLEY TRADE DISPUTES IN THE POST CANADA-
U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CUSTA)79
Given the scope of the U.S. trade remedy laws, these statutes have
been applied against the asymmetric grain trade flows between the two
countries. The recent history of grain trade disputes between the two
countries reveals that U.S. grain producers have attempted, using almost all
of those statutes and even other means (e.g., border blockades), to stop or at
least reduce the flow of Canadian wheat and/or barley into the U.S. market.
The first legal challenge with respect to the bilateral asymmetric wheat
trade flows in the post-CUSTA era began in 1989 when North Dakota
durum wheat producers complained that the Canadian freight subsidies
provided under the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) constituted
78. Id. § 2411 (c).
79. Prior to the implementation of CUSTA, the Commission conducted a number of
investigations on wheat and wheat products exported from Canada. United States International
Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.), Durum and Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, USITC Pub.
3563 at 1-2 (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Durum and Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada]. In 1941,
in an investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the U.S. Tariff
Commission determined in effect that wheat and wheat flour fit for human consumption were
practically certain to be imported under such conditions and in such quantities as to interfere
materially with USDA price support programs for wheat. Id. After reviewing the Commission's
findings, on May 29, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2489
establishing absolute annual global import quotas of 800,000 bushels of wheat fit for human
consumption and 4 million pounds of milled wheat products fit for human consumption. Id.
These quotas essentially remained in effect through 1974. Id. In 1974, at the request of President
Nixon, the Tariff Commission conducted an investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 on wheat and milled wheat products. Id. The Commission
recommended that the President issue a proclamation suspending the import quotas on wheat and
milled wheat products for a one-year period. Id. The President adopted the Commission's
recommendation and decided to suspend the quotas. Id. No action was taken to reinstate the
quotas until 1994. Id.
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an export subsidy in violation of CUSTA Article 701.80 The USTR in-
vestigated the allegation. 81 The USTR found that "subsidies under the
WGTA would not appear to be classified as export subsidies," which
implied that Canada had not violated Article 701.82 That is because the
freight subsidy under the WGTA applied to all shipments to Thunder Bay,
whether destined for export or domestic use. 83 Subsequently, the Canadian
government in 1995 repealed the controversial WGTA.
The second legal challenge was initiated on October 26, 1989 by the
U.S. Congress, which instructed the USITC, under the provisions of Section
332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, to examine the "condition of
competition" of durum wheat between the United States and Canadian
industries. 84 In accordance with Section 332(g) of the Act, the USITC
instituted an investigation. 85 The U.S. Senate Committee on Finance re-
quested the Commission to report the results of its investigation by June 22,
1990.86 The Commission reported on that date the results of its inves-
tigation to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate
Committee on Finance. 87 The USITC rejected the U.S. wheat industry's
80. CUSTA, supra note 2, at 316-17. Article 701 provides the following:
(1) The parties agree that their primary goal with respect to agricultural subsidies is to
achieve, on a global basis, the elimination of all subsidies which distort agricultural
trade, and the Parties agree to work together on multilateral trade negotiations; (2)
[n]either party shall introduce or maintain any export subsidy on any agricultural
goods originating in, or shipped from, its territory that are exported directly or
indirectly to the territory of the other Party; (3) [n]either Party, including any public
entity that it establishes or maintains, shall sell agricultural goods for export to the
territory of the other Party at a price below the acquisition price of the goods plus any
storage, handling or other costs incurred by it with respect to those goods; (4) each
Party shall take into account the export interests of the other Party in the use of any
export subsidy on any agricultural good exported to third countries, recognizing that
such subsidies may have prejudicial effects on the export interests of the other Party;
and (5) Canada shall exclude from the transport rates established under the Western
Grain Transportation Act agricultural goods originating in Canada and shipped via
west coast ports for consumption in the United States of America.
Id.
81. Durum and Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, at 1-2.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. United States International Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.), Durum Wheat: Conditions of
Competition Between the U.S. and Canadian Industries, Investigation No. 332-285, 6 (1990)
[hereinafter Durum Wheat: Conditions of Competition]. On November 15, 1989, the USITC
received a letter from the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, containing an identical request. Id.
85. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1332(g) (2003) (stating that investigations may be instituted by
the President on legislative committees).
86. Durum Wheat: Conditions of Competition.
87. Id.
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allegation that the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) had been dumping durum
wheat into the U.S. market.88
Subsequently, based on complaints filed by grain producers in North
Dakota and Montana, the U.S. Congress requested the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a study analyzing the responsiveness
of durum prices to market forces. 89 The results of the GAO study, pre-
sented during a congressional field hearing in Bismarck, North Dakota, in
December 1989, indicated that prices of durum wheat for sixteen years
(1973-1988) had generally followed the movement of market forces such as
stocks-to-use ratios (e.g., price level bears a strong inverse relationship to
stocks on hand at the end of the year).90
Furthermore, the Chairman of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry Committee's Subcommittee on Domestic and Foreign Marketing
and Product Promotion asked the GAO to obtain information on (i)
Canada's and Australia's grain export marketing systems, including their
respective wheat board operations; (ii) Canada's and Australia's govern-
ment assistance to wheat producers during the last five years; and (iii) any
new export practices established in reaction to the U.S.'s 1985 Export
Enhancement Program and the practice's impact.91 The results of GAO's
study indicated that both Canada and Australia operate wheat boards as part
of their grain-marketing systems.92 These boards generally function as a
single buyer of wheat in their designated region and one of few sellers to
the global wheat market.93 All wheat delivered to marketing boards is
pooled. 94 If the boards incur a deficit on their wheat sales, both govern-
ments reimburse the wheat boards for the deficit on the pooled wheat. 95
The Canadian government guarantees a minimum price to its wheat
farmers. 96 In Canada, the board has incurred only two wheat pool deficits
88. Id.
89. See generally GAO Analysis of Durum Wheat Prices, 2-9, (Dec. 1989), available at
http://161.203.16.4/d38t12/140155.pdf. The U.S. General Accounting Office undertook an audit
of CWB pricing practices. However, it is generally viewed in the United States that the GAO was
not able to complete the study mainly because the CWB refused to provide the information
required for the investigation.
90. Id. at 9. Canadian exporters viewed these investigations as indirect probes of alleged
dumping. Id.
91. REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MARKETING
AND PRODUCT PROMOTION, U.S. SENATE COMMITEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND
FORESTRY, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA RELY HEAVILY ON WHEAT BOARDS TO MARKET GRAIN
2, (1992) available at http://archive.gao.gov/d33tl0/146992.pdf.
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between 1943 and 1990.97 While neither Canada nor Australia directly
subsidizes its wheat exports, each has agricultural programs that indirectly
support wheat exports-in the form of freight subsidies, crop insurance, and
guaranteed minimum prices. 98 A bi-national Panel hearing held in 1992
pursuant to Article 701(3) of the CUSTA, unanimously ruled that there was
no compelling evidence that the CWB was selling wheat below acquisition
cost into the U.S. market.99
Having failed to reduce Canadian exports of wheat, including durum,
into the U.S. market by the use of U.S. trade statutes and CUSTA Articles,
the United States wheat industry pressured the Clinton Administration in
1993 to take further legal action through the Executive Branch under the
provisions of Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act00 (AAA), as
amended.101 As directed by the President, the USITC instituted inves-
tigation No. 22-54 on November 17, 1993, in accordance with the AAA's
procedures, to determine whether wheat was being imported into the United
States under such conditions or in such quantities as to render or tend to
render ineffective or materially interfere with the price support, payment,
and production adjustment program conducted by the USDA for wheat. 102
The USITC determined, by the majority rule, that wheat, wheat flour,
and semolina were being imported into the United States under such
conditions and in such quantities to "materially interfere" with the price
support programs conducted by the USDA for wheat. 103 The Commission's
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, In the Matter of: the Interpretation of and Canada's
Compliance with Article 701(3) with respect to Durum Wheat sales, Final Report, ch. 18 (Feb. 8,
1993).
100. 7 U.S.C. § 624(a) (2000).
101. United States International Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.), Wheat, Wheat Flour, and
Semolina, Investigation No. 22-54, Publ. 2794 (July 1994). The USITC received a letter from
President Clinton stating that he had been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture "that there is
reason to believe that wheat, wheat flour, and semolina are being ... imported into the [U.S.]
under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or
materially interfere with, the price support payment and production adjustment program for wheat
conducted by the [U.S.] Department of Agriculture." Id. at 5.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3. Material interference is defined by the USITC in past cases as "more than
slight interference but less than major interference." When determining whether material
interference is occurring or would occur the Commission has examined factors such as: (i) the
available supply of imports, including import levels, changes in import volumes, world
production, and world stocks of the imported products; (ii) pricing data, including the relationship
between import prices, U.S. prices, and the support price; (iii) information relating to domestic
supply and demand; (iv) data relating to the government programs, including CCC outlays, CCC
surpluses, and changes in the cost to the government of running a program. Three
Commissioners-Rohr, Newquist, and Bragg-determined that the subject goods are imported
into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to materially interfere with
2003] TRADE REMEDY LAWS
report to the President indicated that the Commission had seriously
considered five economic analyses, inter alia, containing empirical evi-
dence submitted by the participants of the investigation, as well as the
USITC staff in its deliberations. 04 The USITC report to the President, in
fact, led to a negotiated settlement for the 1994-95 crop year, which is
known as the Wheat Peace Agreement. 05 In market response to the agree-
ment, the U.S. domestic price of durum wheat rose from $4.67/bushel in
1994 to $5.75/bushel in 1995. However, the price fell to $3.95/bushel in
1997.
There have been a few negotiations on wheat trade between the United
States and Canada despite the many trade disputes between the two
countries. On December 2, 1998, in the aftermath of a series of legal ac-
tions, hostile words, and border blockades, the United States and Canada
announced a Record of Understanding on bilateral agricultural trade that
included the U.S.-Canada Action Plan to improve and expand agricultural
trade relations between the two countries.106 The primary purpose of the
the price support programs conducted by the USDA for wheat. However, three other
Commissioners-Chairman Watson, Vice Chairman Nuzum, and Commissioner
Crawford-determined that (i) wheat, wheat flour, and semolina are not being imported under
such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective the USDA wheat
program; and that (ii) the evidence of the recent impact of increased wheat imports could support
the President finding either material interference or not material interference. When the vote by
the six Commissioners is a tie, it is considered an affirmative determination. Id.
104. Id. During the investigation, the USITC received four economic submissions from
parties to the proceeding. They are SAG (on behalf of the CWB by Sumner, Alston, and Gray);
the Law and Economic Consulting Group; U.S. Department of Agriculture; and ADE (Abel, Draft
and Earley on behalf of the Millers National Federation, the National Pasta Association, and the
National Grain Trade Council, all users of grain). The most detailed one was submitted on behalf
of the CWB by SAG. The SAG submission presents a partial equilibrium simulation model of the
world market consisting of the United States, Canada, and the "rest of the world." The SAG
submission suggested that Canadian wheat export supply has had very small effects on U.S. wheat
prices and on U.S. wheat program costs. The Commission's report indicated that the SAG
analysis contains an extensive comparison of the results of economic models of the effects of
imports on a market. The common ground comparison of the results of economic models
presented by SAG, USDA, and the Commission's empirical model indicates that a one percent
rise in domestic supply (including imports) generates 0.424 percent decline in domestic price.
The USDA price response is much larger (-1.47 percent), and the SAG response is far less (-0.15
percent). The Commissioner's report states further that "on the basis of this discussion, SAG
parameters are chosen such that the effects of Canadian wheat on the U.S. market are small." Id.
at 11-80 to 11-94.
105. Alston, J.M., et al., The Wheat War of 1994, 42 CANADIAN J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 231-51
(1994). The Agreement was effective for only one crop year beginning September 12, 1994 and
ending September 11, 1995. Id.
106. Record of Understanding between the Governments of Canada and the United States of
America Regarding Areas of Agricultural Trade, available at
http://www.agr.ca/cb/trade/canus/html/record-e.phtml (last modified June 24, 2003). The Record
of Understanding is the result of negotiations between the United States and Canada on a number
of trade issues in the fall of 1998. Id. Many of these issues fall into the category of technical
barriers to trade for grains, livestock and meats, and horticultural products. Id.
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Record of Understanding was to ease the tension between the United States
and Canada resulting from the trade in grain and livestock. Although this
U.S.-Canada Action Plan has provided opportunities for United States
growers to ship their grains to Canada and to use the Canadian rail system
to ship grain to destinations in the United States, the plan did not fully
satisfy grain producers in the U.S. because the major issue perceived by the
grain producers is not access to the Canadian market. U.S. grain producers'
major concerns are the rapidly increasing volumes of Canadian exports of
wheat and barley into the United States and their impacts on local grain
prices and farm incomes, particularly in the Northern Plains region. The
root of the problem remains unresolved as far as grain producers in the
United States are concerned.
The most recent dispute has come as a result of a petition from the
North Dakota Wheat Commission alleging that the CWB, a state trading
enterprise with a near monopoly on Canadian wheat sales, engaged in
unfair trade practices in its export sales of wheat to the U.S. market and to
certain third-country markets of interest to U.S. exporters. In September
2000, the North Dakota Wheat Commission filed a petition under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 requested an investigation of the wheat
marketing practices used by the CWB.107 The USTR undertook a sixteen-
month investigation and requested that the USITC examine the competitive
practices of the CWB in the U.S. market and overseas. 108 At the request of
the USTR on April 2, 2001, the Commission, on April 12, 2001, instituted
an investigation concerning the conditions of competition between U.S. and
Canadian wheat in the United States and in certain third country markets.t 09
Two types of wheat-Hard Red Spring and Durum-were included in the
107. Press Release, North Dakota Wheat Commission, Petition Filed Today: USTR Receives
Complaint Against Canadian Trade Practices (Sept. 8, 2000) available at
http://www.ndwheat.com/in/news. The petition alleges that the CWB engages in unfair trading
practices affecting U.S. durum wheat and U.S. hard red spring wheat, predominantly grown in
North Dakota and adjacent states. Id. A dozen U.S. farm organizations, thirty-eight congressmen
and senators, and three elected state officials (North Dakota Governor, Attorney General, and
Commissioner of Agriculture) supported the petition. Press Release, North Dakota Wheat
Commission, Bipartisan Support Extended for 301 Petition Against Canadian Wheat Board (Sept.
27, 2000) available at http://www.ndwheat.com/in/news; Press Release, North Dakota Wheat
Commission, Support Builds for Investigation into CWB Trade Policies and Practices (Oct. 18,
2000) available at http://www.ndwheat.com/in/news.
108. Press Release, USITC, ITC to Investigate Conditions of Competition Between U.S. and
Canadian Wheat Industries (April 13, 2001) available at http://www.edis.usitc.gov. The USTR
investigation followed the receipt in September 2000 of a Section 301 petition from the North
Dakota Wheat Commission, which represented wheat farmers. Press Release, North Dakota
Wheat Commission, Petition Filed Today: USTR Receives Complaint Against Canadian Trade
Practices (Sept. 8, 2000) available at http://www.ndwheat.com/in/news/news detail.
109. Press Release, USITC, ITC to Investigate Conditions of Competition Between U.S. and
Canadian Wheat Industries (April 13, 2001) available at http://www.edis.usitc.gov.
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investigation." 10 The USTR requested that the USITC submit its con-
fidential report to the USTR by September 24, 2001, which was later
extended to November 1, 2001.111
In February 2002, the USTR released the findings of its
investigation.'" 2 The report indicated that the CWB has used special mono-
poly rights and privileges that disadvantage U.S. farmers and were unfair to
trade; it determined that the CWB has, in effect, been taking sales from
U.S. farmers.'" 3 As a result of these findings, the USTR made a decision to
attempt to level the playing field for U.S. farmers. The USTR announced
that it would examine the possibility of filing U.S. countervailing duty and
anti-dumping petitions with the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
USITC."14
An anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigation is normally
initiated by the filing of a petition with both the DOC and the USITC by an
interested party on behalf of a domestic industry. On September 13, 2002,
a petition was filed with the USITC and DOC by the North Dakota Wheat
Commission (hard red spring wheat), the Durum Growers Trade Action
Committee (durum wheat), and the U.S. Durum Growers Association
(durum wheat), alleging that industries in the United States were materially
injured and were threatened with material injury by reason of subsidized
and less than fair value imports of durum and hard red spring wheat from
Canada.l15 On October 23, 2002, the International Trade Administration
110. Id.
111. Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, to Honorable Stephen Koplan, Chairman, USITC
(March 30, 2001) available at http://www.edis.usitc.gov. The Commission ultimately extended
the deadline of the report to November 1, 2001.
112. Press Release, North Dakota Wheat Commission, USTR Rules in Favor of North
Dakota in Section 301 Investigation (Feb. 15, 2002) available at
http://www.ndwheat.com/in/news/news-detail.
113. Id. Press Release, USITC, ITC Votes to Continue Cases on Durum and Hard Red
Spring Wheat from Canada, (Nov. 19, 2002) available at
http://www.usitc.gov/er/nl2002/ER1119zl.htm.; Press Release, North Dakota Wheat
Commission, NDWC Lauds ITC Ruling Confirming Injury to U.S. Producers (Nov. 19, 2002)
available at http://www.ndwheat.com/in/news/newsdetail.
114. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States to Pursue
Action Against Monopolistic Canadian Wheat Board (Feb. 15, 2002) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/02/02-22.pdf. (Last visited Feb. 6, 2004). The USTR stated
that the "USTR has decided not to impose a tariff rate quota (TRQ) at this time since such an
action would violate our NAFTA and WTO commitments, could result in Canadian retaliation
against U.S. agriculture, and would not achieve a durable solution or a permanent change to the
market distortions caused by the monopoly of the Canadian Wheat Board." Id.
115. United States International Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.), Durum and Hard Spring
Wheat from Canada, USITC Pub. 3563, 1-2 (2002) [hereinafter Durum and Hard Spring Wheat]
available at http://www.usitc.gov/wais/reports/arc/w3563.htm (last visited April 7, 2004). This
petition must contain evidence required by Article 5.1 of the Anti-dumping Code. Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Handbook, art. 5.1, Pub. 3566 (2002) [hereinafter Duty Handbook]. The
term "interested party" means a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a
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and the DOC announced their decision to initiate anti-dumping and
countervailing duty investigations on imports of durum and hard red spring
wheat from Canada. 116
On November 25, 2002, the USITC made a preliminary determination
that there was a reasonable indication that the subject industries in the
United States were being materially injured by reasons of imports from
Canada of durum and hard red spring wheat.'" 7 The legal standard for pre-
liminary anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations requires the
Commission to determine, based upon the information available at the time
of the preliminary determinations, whether there is a reasonable indication
that a domestic industry is materially injured, threatened with material
injury, or whether the establishment of an industry is materially retarded by
reason of the allegedly unfairly traded imports. In applying this standard,
the Commission weighs the evidence and determines whether "(i) the
record as a whole contains clear and convincing evidence that there is no
material injury or threat of material injury; and (2) no likelihood exists that
contrary evidence will arise in a final investigation."" 8 The legal standard
for preliminary determination has to be a lower threshold than that of the
final determination due to the fact that, at the preliminary stage of the
investigation, the available information before the Commission is rather
limited.
After an affirmative preliminary determination by the USITC, the DOC
imposed a preliminary countervailing tariff of 3.94 percent, as of March 4,
on all varieties of spring wheat from Canada.' 19 The matter is now before
the USITC for a final determination of material injury, which is scheduled
to deliver in September 2002.120 The DOC also imposed preliminary AD
like good, a union or group of workers representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture,
production, or wholesale in the United States of a like product, or a trade or business association,
a majority of whose members manufacture, produce, or wholesale a like product in the United
States. Id.
116. Durum and Hard Spring Wheat from Canada, supra note 115.
117. Id. at 13. It was a split decision with Commissioner Koplan dissenting. Id. at n.3. The
Commissioner stated that "I find that the record as a whole contains clear and convincing
evidence that there is no reasonable indication of material injury or threat of material injury to the
domestic industries in these subject investigations by reason of the imports of durum wheat and
hard red spring wheat from Canada that are alleged to be subsidized by the Government of
Canada and sold in the United States at less than fair value, and that there is no likelihood that
contrary evidence will be available in any final investigations." Id. at 40.
118. Id. at 31.
119. Duty Handbook, supra note 115, at Art. 5.1. An affirmative preliminary determination
is the basis for the imposition of provisional duties. Id. These normally may not be in place for
more than 120 days. Id.
120. Id. If the final determination of the Commission is affirmative, an anti-dumping duty
order requiring imposition of anti-dumping duties is issued within seven days of notification of
the Commission's determination. Id. The WTO ADA contains an important new provision. Id.
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duties of 8.15 percent on durum and 6.12 percent on hard red spring wheat
importation from Canada on May 2, 2003.
V. PENDING FINAL DETERMINATION OF "MATERIAL INJURY"
BY THE USITC
The USITC is a quasi-judicial, independent, and bipartisan agency
established by Congress with broad investigative powers on matters of
trade. In its adjudicating role, the Commission makes determinations whe-
ther or not the dumping or subsidization has caused or threatened material
injury to production in the United States by imports.121
The overall investigation process for AD and CVD cases can be
divided into five stages, each ending with a determination either by the
DOC or the USITC:122 (i) initiation of the investigation by DOC, (ii) the
preliminary phase of the Commission's investigation, (iii) the preliminary
phase of DOC's investigation, (iv) the final phase of DOC's investigation,
and (v) the final phase of Commission's investigation. 23 The Canadian
durum and HRS wheat case is in the final phase of the Commission's
The relevant provisions of the ADA are, for example: subsection 11.2, which states that the
authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where warranted, on
their own initiative or provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition
of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any interested party which submits positive
information substantiating the need for a review. See id. (referring to the sunset clause for anti-
dumping findings added in 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6a)) requiring review of a finding within five
years of its making). If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine
that the anti-dumping duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately. 19 U.S.C. §
1675 (c)(6a) (2003).
121. United States International Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.), General information about
the USITC and its commissioners (Oct. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/geninfo.htm#itc-does. Commission activities include:
(i) making recommendations to the President regarding relief for industries seriously injured by
increasing imports; (ii) "determining whether U.S. industries are materially injured by imports
that benefit from pricing [below] fair value or from subsidization; (iii) directing actions, subject to
Presidential disapproval, against unfair trade practices such as patent infringement; (iv) advising
the President whether agricultural imports interfere with price-support programs of the [USDA];
(v) conducting studies on trade and tariff issues and monitoring import levels; and (vi)
participating in the development of uniform statistical data on imports, exports and domestic
production, and in the establishment of an international harmonization commodity code.
Id.
122. United States International Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.) Robert Carpenter,
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, Ninth Ed, USITC, Pub. 3482, 11-3 (Dec. 2001).
Until 1954, the U.S. Department of Treasury was responsible for both calculation of dumping
margins and of injury determination. Id. In 1954, the responsibility for inquiring into injury was
moved to the Tariff Commission, now the U.S. International Trade Commission. Id. The Trade
Agreement Act of 1979 delegated authority to investigate dumping and calculation of dumping
margins to the International Trade Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. 19
U.S.C. Ch. 13 (1979).
123. Carpenter, supra note 122, at 11-3.
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investigation at the time this paper was prepared.124 This final phase can be
broken down into eight stages including the following: scheduling of the
final phase, questionnaires, pre-hearing staff report, hearing and briefs, final
staff report and memoranda, closing of the record and final comments by
parties, briefing and vote, and determination and views of the
Commission. 125
In the final determination stage of AD/CVD investigation, what criteria
will be applied by the Commission to determine whether or not the wheat
producers in the United States were materially injured? Material injury is
defined in the U.S. law as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial,
or unimportant."1 26 The U.S. AD/CVD laws set out the various types of
analysis and the factors that are to be used by the commission to determine
whether unfairly traded imports are materially injuring or threatening
material injury to a domestic industry and establish if a causal relationship
exists. 27 "In evaluating the volume of imports, the Commission is directed
to consider whether the volume of subject imports, or any increase in that
volume, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in
the United States, is significant." 128 In "evaluating the effect of imports of
subject merchandise on prices, the Commission is instructed to consider (i)
whether there has been significant price underselling by the imported
merchandise as compared with the price of similar domestic products in the
United States and (ii) whether the effect of imports of such merchandise
otherwise depresses prices to a significant degree or prevents price
increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree."1 29
"In examining the impact of subject imports on producers of
domestic like products, the Commission is to evaluate all relevant
economic factors 30 which have a bearing on the state of the
industry in the United States, including, but not limited to (i)
124. Id. at 11-14. "Under normal circumstances, within 280 days after the date on which the
petition is filed in [AD] cases or 205 days in [CVD] cases, the Commission makes a final
determination of whether an industry in the United States is materially injured or is threatened
with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the [U.S.] is materially retarded, by
reason of imports of the [durum and HRS wheat]." Id.
125. Id.
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7), § 771(7) (1979).
127. Carpenter, supra note 122, at 11-29.
128. Id. at 11-29.
129. Id. (stating that criteria to be used by the USITC to determine whether dumping and/or
subsidization is causing injury are, in fact, reflecting wording in the WTO Antidumping Duty
Agreement); see also WTO Antidumping Duty Agreement. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1672-1677 a-n (noting
that the WTO ADA does not prescribe how national authorities should organize their domestic
laws and procedures to meet the obligation of the Agreement).
130. Carpenter, supra note 122, at 11-29 to 11-30.
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actual and potential declines in output, sales, market share, profits,
productivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity; (ii)
factors affecting domestic prices; (iii) actual and potential negative
effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth,
ability to raise capital, and investment; (iv) actual and potential
negative effects on the existing development and production
efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a
derivative or more advanced version of the domestic product; and
(v) in anti-dumping investigations, the magnitude of the margin of
dumping."131
These factors sometimes are referred to as "the statutory factors" to be
examined in the process of the final determination.
The injury determination process is an extremely complex task given
that a wide variety of economic indicators or factors, as stipulated in WTO
AD/CVD Agreements, have to be observed and analyzed in the process of
final determination.132 Although the observed economic indicators of the
subject industries during the investigation time-period represent the health
of the subject industries in the presence of dumped or subsidized imports
(facts), they are not in and of itself indication injury per se. 133 To arrive at
an evidence of injury, the Commissioners have to estimate the state of the
subject industries in the absence of dumping or subsidization (e.g., coun-
terfactual analysis).1 34 In the case where counterfactual information is not
readily available from historical data, it may have to be estimated by using
such information as price elasticity of substitution between imported and
domestically grown durum and HRS wheat and price elasticity of aggregate
supply and de'mand.135 For example, the higher the magnitude of price
elasticity of substitution between imported and domestically grown wheat,
the higher the magnitude of injury caused by the alleged dumped or
subsidized wheat from Canada. Comparison of the two states (economic
indicators in the presence of dumping/subsidy and in the absence of
dumping/subsidy) of the subject industries would provide some magnitude
131. Id. In a preliminary determination, the Commission is to use the dumping margin(s)
published by Commerce in its notice of initiation of the investigation; in a final determination the
Commission is to use the dumping margin(s) most recently published by Commerce prior to the
closing of the Commission's factual record. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (35)(c), § 771 (35)(c) (1979).
132. D. Featherstone & Ihn Ho Uhm, Trade Disputes: The Anti-dumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws and the Role of Quantitative Economic Analysis, Agricultural Trade under CUSTA,
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of injury indicators.136 The next question before the Commissioners is how
much injury constitutes material injury? 13
7
In general, the outcome of the USITC's final injury determination is
not predictable. The reasons include: (i) the Act defines "material injury" as
"harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant," which is
an ambiguous term without any quantitative standard for materiality;138 (ii)
neither the Act nor the WTO ADA made any attempt to define the concept
of material injury explicitly, resulting in subjective interpretation by the
national authorities; (iii) nowhere in the U.S. statutes is the USITC
expressly told to determine whether the unfair trade practice is the cause of
material injury;139 (iv) there are a large number of material injury indicators
stipulated by the U.S. law and WTO Agreements that make no attempt to
describe how these various factors are to be weighed; and (v) neither U.S.
law nor WTO Agreements specified methodology to be used to arrive at
material injury estimation.
Historical observation of the USITC's injury determination by a
number of economists found some clues as to which of the statutory factors
play important roles in the outcome of a petition. Between 1980 and 1992,
the USITC found injury in the preliminary investigation in seventy-three
percent of the cases filed and found material injury in sixty-six percent of
the cases filed.140 This historical record indicates that the probability of
having an affirmative determination by the USITC is relatively higher than
that of a negative determination.
The next question is which of the statutory factors listed above played
more or less significant role in finding material injury by the Commission?
In addition, it raises questions about the factors affecting the filing behavior
of industries and whether industries are using the law to restrict imports and
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 304-09. The new WTO Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements indicate that
"examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the industry concerned shall include an
evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the
industry." Id. It then provides a non-exhaustive list of such factors, including sales, profits,
output, market share, productivity, prices, and the like. Id. Neither agreements indicates how
these various statutory factors are to be weighed or what quantum of injury is required for
"materiality." Id.
139. Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES, 83-125, (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1996).
140. Faten Sabry, An Analysis of the Decision to File the Dumping Estimates of Anti-
dumping Petitions, XIV THE INT'L TRADE J. 115-16 (2000). A higher percentage of preliminary
determination than that of the final determination is because the standard applied in the
preliminary determination is a lower threshold. Id.; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How the
GAT Affects U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Policy, (1994).
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make more profits when facing unfavorable economic conditions. An
empirical analysis of the demand for AD or CVD protection helps answer
these questions. A number of the empirical analyses indicate that the im-
port-penetration ratio, capacity utilization rate, and the margin of dumping
estimated by the DOC are significant factors in explaining the outcome of
the petitions. 141
Sabry's null hypothesis, for example, was that a high import-
penetration ratio, low profits, and low capacity utilization tend to increase
the probability of success of a petition. 142 The economic variables used in
this study are the import-penetration ratio (predicted sign is a positive
determination) and the percentage change in demand (predicted sign is a
negative determination). As shown in Table 3, out of a large number of sta-
tutory factors, the following economic factors have played an important
role in the outcome of the petition: decline in capacity utilization, decline in
profits, decline in production, increase in level of imports (or import
penetration ratio), dumping margin, and the decline in demand.1
43
The forthcoming final injury determination by the USITC for Canada's
durum and wheat investigation can be affirmative or negative depending on
the Commissioner's implicit or explicit analysis of counterfactual state of
the domestic industry. Some Commissioners may rely on the reasoning
embodied in the explicit mathematical models-USITC's in-house model
known as COMPAS-to derive the counterfactual state of the domestic
industry, expressed by a number of statutory factors such as market shares,
profits, output, price, etc. While some other Commissioners may rely on an
intuitive logical approach to arrive at counterfactual state of the subject
industry. Nevertheless, regardless of the outcome of the petition of this
investigation, the issue does not appear to rest. Interested parties in this
investigation are likely to pursue further challenge through judicial review
either through domestic courts-U.S. Court of International Trade-or
international courts - either NAFTA panel or WTO forum.144
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) created one of the
largest single markets in the world. Ten years after the CUSTA, overall
effects of the agreement in macroeconomics terms have generally been very
141. Infra Table 3.
142. Sabry, supra note 140, at 115-16.
143. Infra Table 3.
144. WTO Agreement, supra note 54. Canada and the United States, through CUSTA and
NAFTA, introduced new bi-national dispute settlement mechanisms, which is an alternative
avenue of judicial review in lieu of domestic courts. Id.
2003]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
positive on both sides of the border as the two-way trade reached nearly
two and one-half times the level before the agreement. 145 However, there
have been several trade disputes concerning grains trade during the post-
CUSTA era. Literature review indicates that asymmetric trade flows have
caused these disputes. There are interwoven multiple factors influencing
bilateral trade, including the persistent differences in grain marketing and
delivery systems, farm subsidy programs, trade policies between these two
countries, and the relative value of the Canadian dollar.
The trade dispute between the two trading partners is extremely
complex to resolve and undoubtedly requires Solomon's wisdom. There
are two opposite views on the resolution among agricultural economists.
One group of economists argue that gradual harmonization of trade
policies, farm subsidy programs, and marketing institutions would reduce
trade disputes between the two countries in the future. However, some are
skeptical of such a view based on the fact that an elimination of Canada's
WGTA, to some extent, harmonized grain freight rate structures between
the two countries but did not lead to a significant reduction in Canadian
exports to the United States. On the contrary, an elimination of the century
long freight rate subsidy in Canada encouraged Canadian grain producers to
divert grain shipments from the world market to the United States.
Simultaneous and comprehensive harmonization of trade policies, farm
subsidies, and marketing institutions could be more effective in reducing
trade disputes between the two countries rather than partial harmonization.
However, U.S. trade disputes with other major trading partners could
increase to protect the U.S. industries from unfair foreign competition under
a freer trade environment.
As long as U.S. imports of wheat from Canada are many times larger
than its exports to Canada and the U.S. grain producers perceive that the
increased imports from Canada cause injury, trade disputes (by means of
the U.S. trade remedy laws) could continue despite the harmonization of
grain sectors in the two countries.
145. CANADA WEST FOUNDATION, Ten Years After: Cross-Border Export/Import Trends
Since the Canada- U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 1 (1999).
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Table 1. Bilateral Trade of the Selected Grains between the
United States and Canada, 1990-2002.
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 Average
-- - - - - - - ---- million bushels-- ------------
U.S. Imports from Canada
HRS 13.2 34.8 77.5 39.0 57.7 57.4 60.1 44.1 46.7
Durum 10.0 19.0 13.8 9.2 15.7 10.7 16.0 21.8 15.2
Barley 9.9 20.0 89.7 36.6 32.1 26.7 29.5 21.9 32.9
U.S. Exports to Canada
HRS 0.0 0.8 0.9 2.8 0.4 0.8 1.4 0.3 0.9
Durum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2
Barley 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.6 1.6 3.7 6.3 1.35
Source: U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)/U.S. Dept. of Agriculture
2003]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Table 2. U.S. Trade Statutes and Statutory Requirements for
Relief (e.g., Injury Test)
Trade Statutes in Primary Purpose of Investigating Statutory




Agricultural Adjust- To ensure that im- USITC for deter- Required "material
ment Act (Section ports of agricultural mination of "mat- interference test"
22 of the AAA of products do not un- erial interference;" vis-A-vis a farm
1933, as amended) dermine domestic USDA is a commodity program
(1) farm programs. designated administered by
interested party. USDA.
Anti-dumping - To protect domestic USITA (DOC) for Required "material
Dumped imports industries from in- determination of injury test" caused
(Title VII of the jurious effects of dumping; USITC by subject imports.
Tariff Act of 1930, dumping. for determination
as amended) of material injury.
Conditions of To investigate the USITC; USITA Not applicable.
Competition (Tariff conditions affecting (DOC).
Act of 1930, as competition and the
amended, Section U.S. industries
332) competitiveness.
Countervailing Duty To protect domestic USITA (DOC) for Required "material
- Subsidized imports industries from sub- determination of injury test" caused
(Subtitle A of Title sidization by foreign subsidization; by the subject
VII of the Tariff Act governments. U S IT C f o r imports.
of 1930, as determination of
amended) material injury.
Enforcement Action To enforce U.S. rights USTR Not applicable.
- Unfair trade gained under inter-
(Section 301 of the national trade
Trade Act of 1974, agreement.
as amended)
Import Relief To deal with the USITC for Required "serious
(Safeguard) (Section temporary adverse determination of injury test" caused
201 of the Trade Act effects of fair import "serious injury." by the subject





(1)7 U.S.C. 624. Section 22 authority is now available only for imports from
countries to which the U.S. does not apply the WTO Agreement.
(2)Serious injury test requires somewhat higher legal standard than that of the
material injury threshold.
Source: Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives,
Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington D.C., June 1997.
Table 3: Selected Empirical Studies on the Statutory Factors
Affecting the Outcome of the AD Petitions (i.e.,
Affirmative Findings of Material Injury)
Author(s) Statutory Factors Affecting the Method Used Study Period
Outcome of the Petitions (i.e.,
affirmative findings)
Goldstein and Decline in capacity utilization and Logit analysis 1960-84
Lenway (1989) profits. USITC decisions not
directly influenced by political
forces.
Moore (1992) Decline in production and increase
in the level of imports. (
Finger, Hall, and None of the political variables is
Nelson (1982) significant, while the technical
factors (e.g., injury indicators
specified by the law) are significant
and have the expected sign.
Anderson Statutory requirements (i.e., injury
(1993) indicators specified by the law)
appear to be the primary force
underlying the USITC decisions (2)
Hansen (1990) Trade protection (e.g., tariff, AD, Nested Logit 1974-84
escape clause petitions) is subject to model
domestic forces similar to those
affecting other regulatory policy
areas.
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The import-penetration ratio,
dumping margin (estimated by
DOC), and percentage change in
demand (3)
Probit model 1986-92
The level of industrial concentration Univariate
of the petitioning industry is Probit model
statistically significant in explaining
the probability of filing, but not the
probability of success of the
petition.
The import-penetration ratio is a
statistically significant factor in
explaining both the decision to file
and the outcome of the petitions. In
addition, the probability of success
of a petition is significantly affected
by the magnitude of dumping
margin, capacity utilization rate, and
percentage change in demand.
Employment has the predicted sign,
but is not statistically significant.
The level of industrial concentration
affects the decision to file, but not




(1)The study indicated that industries with plants in the states of the Senate
Trade Subcommittee members are more likely to receive an affirmative finding in
the final determination.
(2)The study indicated that none of the political factors is significant in
explaining the probability of an affirmative finding.
(3)Employment and industrial concentration index (i.e., domestic market
structure) have correct sign, but neither estimate is statistically significant.
Sabry (2000)
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